تنظیم قوانین و مقررات در نظام بانکی ایران با تأکید بر نقش مجلس و قانونگذاران: رویکرد نظریه بازیها | ||
| سیاست گذاری اقتصادی | ||
| دوره 17، شماره 34، مهر 1404، صفحه 225-254 اصل مقاله (728.97 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22034/epj.2025.21482.2581 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| حسین سیلسپور* 1؛ محمدجواد محقق نیا2؛ شیما احمدی3 | ||
| 1دانشجوی دکتری. گروه مالی بانکداری، دانشکده مدیریت و حسابداری، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی (ره)، تهران ایران | ||
| 2دانشیار گروه مالی و بانکداری، دانشکده مدیریت و حسابداری، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی (ره)، تهران ایران | ||
| 3گروه حسابداری، دانشکده علوم اجتماعی و اقتصاد، دانشگاه الزهرا، تهران، ایران | ||
| چکیده | ||
| یکی از چالشهای اساسی نظام بانکی ایران، تنظیم قوانین و مقررات است که نقش کلیدی در بحرانهای مالی و بانکی دارد. بدون توجه به بازیگران حوزه مقررات بانکی، نمیتوان به اهداف مطلوب دستیافت. در این پژوهش، با استفاده از روش تحلیل محتوا و مصاحبه با خبرگان، خواستهها و اقدامات موردنیاز شناسایی شدهاند. از طریق رویکرد نظریه بازیها و مدل گراف، وضعیت تعادل بین بازیگران کلیدی مانند قانونگذاران، بانک مرکزی، بانکها، مشتریان، سرمایهگذاران و سازمانهای بینالمللی بررسی شده است. وضعیت تعادل بین بازیگران از طریق مصاحبهها و تعیین ترجیحات آنها در خصوص وضعیتهای بازی مشخص شده و با تحلیل مسیر تکاملی، حرکات بازیگران از وضع موجود به وضعیت تعادل تعیین شده است. نتایج این پژوهش نشان داد که وضعیت تعادل فعلی مطلوب جامعه و سیاستگذاران نیست و برای رسیدن به تعادل مطلوب، نیاز به تغییر ترجیحات بازیگران وجود دارد. از طریق تحلیل بازی معکوس، مشخص شد که قانونگذاران و بانک مرکزی باید با تنظیم قوانین و مقررات نوآورانه که فضای نوآوری را به رسمیت میشناسند، به وضعیت مطلوب برای اقتصاد کشور دست یابند. این پژوهش به سیاستگذاران کمک میکند تا درک بهتری از پویاییها و تعاملات بین بازیگران داشته باشند و سیاستهای مؤثرتری طراحی کنند. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| تنظیم مقررات بانکی؛ نظریه بازیها؛ مدل گراف؛ تعامل بین ذینفعان | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Regulating Laws and Regulations in the Iranian Banking System with a Focus on the Role of the Parliament and Legislators: A Game Theory Approach | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Hossein Seilsepoor1؛ Mohammad Javad Mohagahnia2؛ Shima Ahmadi3 | ||
| 1Ph.D. Student, Financial and Banking Department, Faculty of Management and Accounting , Allameh Tabatabi University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 2Associate Professor, Financial and Banking Department, Faculty of Management and Accounting , Allameh Tabatabi University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 3Faculty of Economic and Social Science , Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Purpose: The main objective of this article is to thoroughly examine the role of the parliament and legislators in the regulation of banking practices and its impact on financial stability and trust in the financial system. The study specifically focuses on the significance of regulatory responses to new challenges in financial technologies, such as digital currencies, and their effects on traditional financial systems. Utilizing the game theory, the current research analyzes the structure of the interactions among key players such as the government, parliament, banks, and customers. It demonstrates how differences in preferences and resources can lead to various equilibrium scenarios in regulatory settings. The study emphasizes that the formulation of laws and regulations should aim to foster stability, promote innovation, and ensure economic and social sustainability, with the parliament and legislators playing a crucial role in guiding this process. By examining historical experiences and international comparisons, this research proposes strategies to address the misalignments and power differentials among stakeholders to achieve more desirable equilibriums. Methodology: This study employs a graph model within the framework of the game theory to analyze the balance of interests among the stakeholders in the regulatory settings of the banking sector in Iran. This method, developed by Feng et al. (2005) and Wong et al. (2018), serves to examine conflicts in arenas with multiple actors and diverse options. The modeling in the graph model includes defining possible moves and hypothetical conflict scenarios following the identification of stakeholders and their demands. This process, employing techniques such as weighting options and prioritizing, contributes to the evaluation system. The GMCR+ software is used to model and analyze conflicts, providing the capability for more precise analysis and examination of equilibrium states (Feng et al., 2003). This approach not only focuses on strategic analysis but also offers deeper insights and practical solutions to improve the current conditions and achieve balance in the banking network. The research data are collected through interviews, and the analyses are based on the principle of theoretical saturation. Findings and Discussion: This study employs the game theory and graph modeling to analyze the equilibrium of the stakeholder interests in the regulatory framework of banking in Iran. By identifying five key players and ten possible options for these actors, the study presents a comprehensive analysis of the potential conflicts and equilibria within this sector. The modeling in the graph model includes defining possible moves and hypothetical conflict scenarios, which were identified through semi-structured interviews with the stakeholders. The application of the game theory allows for a more detailed observation and analysis of equilibrium states and strategic decision-making by the actors. The analysis reveals that some options are simultaneously incompatible and cannot coexist in a common state. These conflicts assist in eliminating impossible states from the game space, resulting in the identification of possible and stable equilibrium states. Using the GMCR+ software for modeling and conflict analysis, the study indicates that Equilibrium 9 is the most stable state among the possible scenarios. In this state, legislators and regulatory bodies focus on drafting preventive laws, banks actively comply with regulations, and customers carefully select financial services. This state represents a strong equilibrium in the game, where there are fewer changes made by the actors to improve the situation. Reverse game analysis suggests that changes in the preferences and strategies of the actors may facilitate reaching more optimal equilibrium states. This analysis enables policymakers to design more effective policies to manage stakeholders in the banking sector by better understanding the dynamics and interactions among the actors. The findings of this research can help policymakers and market regulators gain a better understanding of the dynamics present in banking regulation and move towards more stable and desirable equilibria using optimal strategies. The research also demonstrates that collaboration and interaction among various actors can lead to the creation of new and more beneficial equilibria in the banking system, which serves as a key strategy for addressing future challenges in this sector. Conclusions and Policy Implications: The current research focuses on the strategic equilibria of actors within the regulatory framework of banking, emphasizing that various stakeholders such as legislators, regulatory bodies, banks, financial institutions, customers, borrowers, investors, and international organizations each pursue unique strategies that lead to diverse equilibria within the banking system. Analyses indicate that these strategies play a significant role in achieving new and stable equilibria. The study reveals that Equilibrium 9 is a point where actors maintain their strategies without the inclination to change. This state is considered a stable and pivotal condition in banking strategies, representing stability and attractiveness and providing various options for the actors involved. Reverse game analysis also suggests that the current equilibrium state may not be the most desirable for policymakers and the society, highlighting the need for a change in the role of legislators and regulatory bodies to recognize emerging technologies. This research emphasizes that regulatory policies in banking should be flexible and dynamic enough to adapt to continual environmental changes and supports the ongoing stability and growth in the banking sector. | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| Banking regulation, Game theory, Graph model, Stakeholder interaction | ||
| مراجع | ||
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